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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Continued litigation in the courts apparently will prove a fruitless
method of solving the problem areas of the federal-state jurisdictional
question. The United States Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd.51 has indicated it will not step in to fill the no-man's land
left in the NLRA by the Congress. The ultimate solution will be for
Congress to express its intent as to the proper bounds of the NLRB's
jurisdiction.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
Liens-Mechanic's Liens-Acquisition and Priorities-Effect of
Regaining Possession
Since Johnson v. Yates' it has been the rule in North Carolina that
a mortgagor in possession with the consent of the mortgagee may subject
a mortgaged automobile to a mechanic's lien which will take priority
over the chattel mortgagee's interest. In that case it was decided that
the statutory term, "owner or legal possessor,"'2 included such a mort-
gagor, in whom the law implied authority from the mortgagee to con-
tract for necessary and reasonable repairs.
In Barbre-Askew Finance, Inc. v. Thompson,8 the chattel mortgagor
of an automobile left it with a mechanic under a contract for repairs at
a stated price. After the major portion of the work was completed, the
mechanic relinquished possession to the mortgagor with the understand-
ing that the automobile was to be returned for completion of repairs.
The automobile was subsequently returned and the repairs completed.
While it was in the shop for these latter repairs the mortgagor defaulted
In the Guss case the Court held that if a dispute affected interstate commerce so
as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the states were precluded from
acting even where the NLRB had announced in advance that it would decline
jurisdiction unless certain specified amounts of interstate commerce were involved.
See note 26 supra.
rx 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957). "We are told . . . that to deny the State juris-
diction here will create a vast no-man's-land, subject to regulation by no agency
or court. We are told . . . that to grant jurisdiction would produce confusion and
conflicts with federal policy .... [B]oth may be right. We believe, however, that
Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress' power
in the area of commerce among the states is plenary, its judgment must be respected
whatever policy objections there may be to creation of a non-man's-land. Congress
is free to change the situation at will." See Henderson, The "No Man's" Land
Betweeit State and Federal Jurisdiction, 8 LAB. L.J. 587 (1957).
1183 N.C. 24, 110 S.E. 603 (1922).
I N.C. GEx. STAT. § 44-2 (1949). "Any mechanic or artisan who makes,
alters or repairs any article of personal property at the request of the owner or
legal possessor of such property has a lien on such property so made, altered or
repaired for his just and reasonable charge for his work done and material
furnished, and may hold and retain possession of the same until such just and
reasonable charges are paid ... " This statute further provides for enforcement
by sale.
247 N.C. 143, 100 S.E2d 381 (1957).
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and the mortgagee brought an action to recover it. The mechanic at-
tempted to assert a lien for the entire amount of the repairs. The
court held that by voluntarily surrendering the automobile, the mechanic
lost his lien for all work done prior to his subsequent reacquisition of
possession even though all repairs were made under one contract.
4
While the decisions following the common law tend to give the
artisan's possessory lien priority over a chattel mortgagee's interest,5
in some states, by express statutory provision, a duly recorded chattel
mortgage has priority over a later lien for repairs.e
In jurisdictions where the mechanic's lien prevails, if it is a lien
depending upon possession, it is lost when possession is lost.7 "At
common law, a lien (of this general description) is a right to retain.
Retention necessarily connotes possession. A lien depends upon an un-
interrupted possession, and is lost or waived when possession is vol-
untarily surrendered .... ,,8 The North Carolina statute providing for
a mechanic's lien9 has been construed as affirming the common law
rights with the addition of a remedy in the form of foreclosure by sale.10
As the court indicated in the principal case, there is a split of
authority as to whether a mechanic's lien is reacquired when possession
is regained." In Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co.12 the mechanic un-
lawfully retook possession of the automobile and then tried to assert his
"A lien is a right to hold goods until the payment of a debt due thereon. Any
agreement, therefore, which contemplates that the goods of the debtor are to be
delivered to him before the time of payment arises is inconsistent with and de-
structive of the lien in question." BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 110 (2d ed.
1955).
"Blackard v. City Natl Bank, 142 F. Supp. 753 (D. Alaska 1956); Annot.,
36 A.L.R.2d 198 (1954) (conditional sales); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 229 (1954)
(chattel mortgages).0 Ky. REV. STAT. § 382.610(4) (1953). "The mortgage provided for in this
section shall be a valid lien on the property therein described and conveyed and
-from the recording thereof shall be superior to the rights of all creditors of the
mortgagor and all subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, lienors and encumbrancers,
except the landlord's liens provided for in KRS 383.070 and 383.110." LA. REv.
STAT. § 9:4501 (1951) provides for a repairman's lien and then says, "This priv-
ilege has no effect against a vendor's privilege, a chattel mortgage previously re-
corded . . . ." S.D. CODE OF 1939 c. 39.0802 provides: "Such lien on personal
property shall be subject only to liens, mortgages, and conditional sales contracts
properly filed on or before the time that the property comes into the possession of
the lien claimant."T Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E. 461
(1929).
'Rapp v. Mabbett Motor Car Co., 201 App. Div. 283, 194 N.Y. Supp. 200,
202 (4th Dep't 1922) (dictum).
o See note 2 supra.
"0 Johnson v. Yates, 183 N.C. 24, 27, 110 S.E. 603, 604 (1922) ; McDougall v.
Crapon, 95 N.C. 292 (1886); Notes, 1 N.C.L. Rrv. 127 (1922), 23 N.C.L. REv.
357 (1945).11Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 198 (1954) (conditional sales); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d
229 (1954) (chattel mortgages) ; Notes, 15 IND. L.J. 573 (1940), 26 TuL. L. REv.
258 (1951), 16 U. DEr. L.J. 202 (1953).1'201 App. Div. 283, 194 N.Y. Supp. 200 (4th Dept 1922).
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lien under a statute providing that the mechanic "may detain such motor
vehicle... at any time it may be lawfully in his possession .... ,"1 3 The
court held that by unlawfully retaking the automobile, the mechanic was
not within the provisions of the statute and the chattel mortgagee pre-
vailed. It was indicated, however, that had the retaking been lawful, the
mechanic's lien would have attached and prevailed. Commercial Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Hislop Garage Co.14 involved a fact situation similar
to that in the principal case. In this case, a conditional vendor brought
an action of replevin against a mechanic who had reacquired posses-
gion and claimed, under a single contract, a lien for repairs made both
before release to the conditional vendee and after the return of the auto-
mobile to the mechanic. The court held that the agreement to bring
the automobile back (with subsequent reacquisition) gave the mechanic
sufficient possession to preserve his lien. In Gordon v. Sullivan,16
under a single contract for repairs, the automobile was released to the
conditional vendee on his agreement to return it for completion of
repairs. It was then taken by the vendee to another garage and stored.
The mechanic, claiming authority from the vendee, paid the storage bill
and retook possession. The trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee brought
an action against the mechanic to recover possession of the automobile.
Under a statute providing that mechanics "may detain such motor
vehicles at any time they may have lawful possession thereof,"' the
court held that the mechanic's lien prevailed. "While a garage keeper's
lien partakes of the nature of a possessory lien because possession is
essential to its enforcement, it differs from the common law lien in that
its existence does not depend upon continuance of possession." 1
The court in Johnson v. Yates, in order to show that the mechanic's
possessory lien for repairs is an exception to the general rule that a lien
prior in time is prior in right,'8 placed great weight on an implied
"
8 N.Y. LiEN LAW § 184 (Supp. 1957). "A person keeping a garage . . .or
place for the ... repair of motor vehicles ... and who in connection therewith ...
repairs any motor vehicle .. .at the request or with the consent of the owner,
whether such owner be a conditional vendee or a mortgagor remaining in possession
or otherwise; has a lien upon such motor vehicle ... for the sum due ... and may
detain such motor vehicle ... at any time it may be lawfully in his possession until
such sum is paid, except that if the lienor, subsequent to thirty days from the
accrual of such lien, allows the motor vehicle . . . out of his actual possession the
lien provided for in this section shall thereupon become void as against all condi-
tional sales agreements or mortgages . .. executed prior to the accrual of such
lien .... "
1489 N.H. 45, 192 Atl. 627 (1937). 15 188 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
X D.C. CoDE § 38-201 (1951). "Garage keepers shall also have a lien for
their charges for storage, repairs ... when such charges are incurred by an owner
or conditional vendee of such motor vehicles, and may detain such motor vehicles at
any time they may have lawful possession thereof . . .17188 F.2d at 981.
18 United Tire & Investment Co. v. Maxwell, 202 Okla. 476, 215 P.2d 541
(1950) ; 33 Am. Jut., Liens § 33 (1941) ; 53 C.J.S., Liens § 10(b) (1948).
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authority from the mortgagee to the mortgagor to subject the automobile
to a mechanic's lien for all necessary and reasonable repairs. In the
principal case, the court did not mention the point that the repairs must
be necessary and reasonable, but if they were not, the priority of the lien
over the mortgage might be disallowed for this reason. 19
JEAN M. LucK
Military Law-Illegality of Orders
Under the Uniform Code of Military justice disobedience of an order
is punishable only if the order is legal.- Illegality, whenever found,
voids the order.2 This Note is intended to illustrate some of the con-
troversies that have arisen in this area.
Disobedience of an order which is palpably illegal on its face, such
as an order to commit murder or larceny, would not subject one to
punishment.3 Indeed, compliance with a palpably illegal order cannot
usually be justified; and in a trial by court-martial or a suit in damages
for an act done in obedience, the order will be admissible only in mitiga-
tion of the offense.4 However, an order not palpably illegal on its face
is usually presumed to be legal, and the risk of disobedience is the
personal responsibility of the recipient of the order.5
1 This question has received considerable attention in Indiana. See Campa
v. Consolidated Finance Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289 (1953) (could not
show necessity of repairs so as to raise implied consent of conditional sales vendor,
vendor won over repairman); Personal Finance Co. v. Fecknoe, 216 Ind. 330, 24
N.E.2d 694 (1940) (could not show necessity of repairs, mortgagee won over
repairman) ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 206 Ind. 296, 187 N.E. 382 (1933)
(repairman won over mortgagee). In the latter case the court said, "The repairs
for which the lien will be enforced must be necessary and add to the value of the
property; ... unless they are clearly beyond this requirement.. ." the mechanic's
lien will prevail. Id. at 302, 187 N.E. at 384.
'Article 90, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (Supp. IV,
1957).
"Any person subject to this code who-
"(2)willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer;
shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at
any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may
direct."
Article 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (Supp. IV, 1957),
provides that any warrant officer or enlisted person who willfully disobeys the
lawful order of one senior to him shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (Supp. IV, 1957),
provides that any person subject to the Code who violates or fails to obey any
lawful general order or regulation shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
- AviNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 207 (1957).
'1 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 575 (2d ed. 1920).
'Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 266 (1878); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S.
(5 Otto) 204 (1877); United States v. Kinder 14 C.M.R. 742 (1954); State
v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627 (1864).
'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 169b. See United
States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953) ; United States v. Trani,
1 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 3 C.M.R. 27 (1952); United States v. Reese, 7 C.M.R. 292
(1953).
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